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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the relationship between CMO tenure and firm risk as
measured by cost of capital. The author develops a conceptual model linking the direct
impact of CMO tenure on the firm’s cost of capital and indirect impact through brand
equity. The hypotheses are tested using data on 125 public US-based firms between 2004
and 2013. The findings suggest that longer CMO tenure results in higher brand equity.
Further, longer CMO tenure reduces cost of capital through its impact on brand equity.
The author also finds that the impact of CMO tenure on brand equity is strengthened
when the CEO has prior marketing experience as well as when the CEO and CMO have
same-firm prior experience. However, the impact is weaker when the CEO has greater
general ability (i.e., generalist). Post-hoc analyses reveals that CMO tenure has
economically meaningful impact on cost of capital by releasing extra working capital for
investment outside. The findings imply that a revolving CMO door is costly for the firm.
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CHAPTER 1: THE IMPACT OF CMO TENURE ON BRAND EQUITY
AND COST OF CAPITAL: INSIGHTS FROM BUSINESS TO
CONSUMER INDUSTRIES1
The Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) job is a demanding one. Frequent changes in
consumer behavior, a fragmented media landscape and mounting pressure for
accountability makes CMOs an ‘endangered species.’ The business press frequently
laments about declining CMO tenures and that CMO tenure, relative to other executives
(e.g., CEOs and CFOs), remains significantly lower (Perlberg 2014). A survey study of
over 150 corporations revealed that over half of them replaced their CMOs in the past
two years. Kathleen Schaub, a Vice President at IDC, calls this an ‘astonishing
percentage’ and remarks that the CMO job requirement has shifted from building
awareness and campaigns to applying analytics and other digital marketing technologies
to drive revenues (Moorman and Day 2016; Murphy 2014). These trends have led to
remorseful commentary amongst marketing executives that the CMO job is the ‘most
dangerous job in business’ (McGirt 2007).
Does CMO tenure impact firm performance? Extant research on executive tenure
in other functions offers two contrasting perspectives to understand this issue. On the one
hand, frequent CMO turnovers could be detrimental to firm performance because a new
CMO in the firm would ostensibly seek to alter the focus of marketing efforts and render

Swartz, Tracey A., Kartik Kalaignanam, and Satish Jayachandran. To be submitted to
Journal of Marketing.
1

1

marketing campaigns and messages to be inconsistent. This decision-inconsistency could
adversely impact customers and market perceptions about the brand and diminish firm
performance (Challagalla, Murtha, and Jaworski 2014). A white paper notes that the cost
of a revolving door in marketing is significant as a longer tenure allows marketers to test
initiatives and leverage investments better over time (Katz 2011). On the other hand, long
tenured CMOs may be susceptible to rigid thinking, cease to make adaptive changes, and
thus marketing programs might get ‘stale’ rather quickly (Henderson, Miller, and
Hambrick 2006; Miller 1991). Therefore, shorter CMO tenures could help infuse new
perspectives, prevent incumbent CMOs from succumbing to internal inertial forces and
thereby improve market performance.
While both perspectives seem plausible from a theoretical standpoint, it is unclear
if one set of predictions would empirically prevail over the other in the CMO context.
These concerns are especially relevant because CMO tenure is significantly shorter than
CEO and CFO tenure. Hence, a systematic understanding of the performance effects of
CMO tenure is paramount to advancing marketing practice and scholarship. The
objective of this study is to empirically examine whether CMO tenure matters from the
standpoint of firm performance. Our performance metric is the firm’s cost of capital.
There have been calls in marketing that to change the perception of marketing as an
expense to one of strategic investment, research needs to relate investments in marketing
assets to the firm’s financing costs and risk (Day and Fahey 1988; Srivastava, Shervani,
and Fahey 1998). Other researchers note the urgency of establishing marketing’s
relevance through studies linking customer mindset metrics, like brand equity, to firm
risk measures, such as the cost of capital (Katsikeas et al. 2016). This study responds to
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these calls. Furthermore, using the firm’s cost of capital, opposed to more traditional
measures of firm performance (e.g., Tobin’s Q) allows for us to capture the market value
of expected future cash flows and growth rates (El Ghoul et al. 2011). Our interest in cost
of capital is guided by the view that short CMO tenure often leads to inconsistency in
marketing efforts. It is known that marketing actions create shareholder wealth by not
only accelerating cash flows but also by reducing the vulnerability of cash flows (Rao
and Bharadwaj 2008; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). Therefore, inconsistency in
marketing actions should increase the firm’s cost of capital.
The firm’s cost of capital is the internal rate of return imposed by equity holders
and debt holders to determine its current market value. If longer CMO tenure lowers the
equity and debt holder’s perceptions about the riskiness of the firm, then the firm should
benefit from lower financing costs. In addition, by focusing on a metric like cost of
capital, we quantify the impact of CMO tenure on working capital needs of the firm and
derive practical implications about CMO tenure. We argue that greater CMO tenure
lowers cost of capital by reducing stakeholder uncertainty about the firm’s marketing
trajectory. Consistency in the firm’s marketing efforts is likely to lower fluctuations in
performance and thus lower the firm’s working capital needs. Further, we hypothesize
that superior brand performance is the pathway through which lower financing costs
manifest.
Our study makes three important contributions to marketing theory and practice.
First, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the risk impact of
CMO tenure. Specifically, we test the impact of CMO tenure on brand performance and
the firm’s cost of capital. Table 1.1 presents an overview of previous research and
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findings on the CMO-performance relationship. As seen in Table 1.1, research in
marketing has largely focused on the issue of whether the presence (or absence) of CMOs
impacts firm performance. The findings from these studies are not entirely consistent.
While Nath and Mahajan (2008) find no significant relationship between CMO presence
and firm performance, a study using a larger sample by Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal
(2015) reports a positive relationship between CMO presence and firm performance after
accounting for endogeneity and unobservable firm heterogeneity. More recently,
researchers have sought to understand the determinants of CMO turnover (Nath and
Mahajan 2017), but this does not consider the performance consequences thereof.
Overall, though prior research has accumulated valuable insights on the CMO presencefirm performance relationship, research on whether CMO tenure impacts firm
performance is virtually absent. Moorman and Day (2016, p.17) note that although
marketing leader turnover is higher than for other leaders, research examining factors that
influences turnover rates and consequences of turnover for performance is limited. Our
study responds to this call for research.
Our second contribution is that we offer empirical evidence on the pathway
through which CMO tenure impacts firm performance. We argue that greater CMO
tenure should improve brand equity which in turn should lower the cost of capital.
Previous research has demonstrated that brand metrics are associated with lower firm risk
and lower working capital requirements (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer 2011; Rao,
Bharadwaj, and Hanssens 2017). However, there is virtually no research on how stability
(or churn) in the marketing C-suite impacts brand performance. This is surprising given
that CMOs are directly or indirectly custodians and stewards of brand and customer
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assets. We argue that longer CMO tenure ensures greater consistency and continuity of
marketing programs and that this benefit should positively impact brand performance. By
postulating brand performance as a mediator of the CMO tenure and firm performance
relationship, we offer empirical evidence to support the idea that marketing actions add
value by reducing vulnerability of cash flows and lowering working capital needs by
creating market based assets (Rao and Bharadwaj 2008; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey
1998).
Third, our study identifies important contingencies for the CMO tenure-brand
performance relationship. Based on insights gathered from field interviews with CMOs,
we focus on CEO specific factors to understand the variation in the relationship between
CMO tenure and brand performance. The premise of examining CEO specific factors is
based on a broad consensus in the field interviews that the CEO plays a crucial role in
allowing the CMO to ensure consistency of marketing efforts, manage customer
perceptions, and minimize brand confusion in the marketplace. Accordingly, we test the
moderating influence of a) CEO marketing experience, b) CEO-CMO same-firm prior
experience and c) CEO general ability (i.e., breadth of skills accumulated through career
experience). These moderators are of direct importance to managers and offers guidance
on the (mis)match between CMOs and CEOs from the standpoint of brand and firm
performance. Finally, we perform post-hoc analyses to demonstrate the economic (dollar)
impact of CMO tenure on the firm’s financing costs and released working capital.
The results support our hypotheses and show that CMO tenure is positively
associated with brand equity and negatively associated with cost of capital. Further, we
find support for brand equity mediating the impact of CMO tenure on cost of capital.
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Finally, the moderator results suggest that the positive CMO tenure-brand equity
relationship is stronger when a) the CEO has prior marketing experience and b) when the
CMO-CEO have same-firm prior experience. Interestingly, we find that the CMO tenurebrand equity positive relationship is muted when the CEO has higher general ability.
Collectively, our findings provide evidence for the positive effects of CMO longevity in
firms.
1.1 FIELD INTERVIEWS
Given the sparse research on the CMO role and performance effects thereof,
coupled with limited research on factors affecting the CMO role, we use a theories-in-use
approach (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007) to gather preliminary insights about key
factors that CMOs face in improving marketing performance. To identify participants, we
used the Corporate Affiliations database and personal contacts. We interviewed 24 senior
marketing executives in the United States. The executives worked in retail, restaurants,
telecommunications, software, airlines, media and home building industries. The average
number of employees at firms represented by these executives is 46,000 and the titles
held by these executives are ‘Chief Marketing Officer’, ‘Executive Vice-President’,
‘Senior Vice-President’ and ‘Vice-President’.
We used a structured questionnaire for the interview. Most of the questions were
open-ended to elicit opinions and insights from managers in a natural and conversational
manner. The questions posed to executives focused on the broad topics/themes such as
the challenges faced by CMOs in improving marketing and financial performance. Most
of the executives interviewed felt that the tenure of CMOs is relatively shorter compared
to that of other officers in the C-suite (69%). When asked specifically about key
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challenges faced by CMOs in proving marketing performance, several respondents
pointed out that CEOs played a crucial role in allowing CMOs to succeed. In the words
of one marketing executive:
“Because many of them don’t really understand marketing, some CEOs think it is
easier to replace the CMO than similar C positions. We sometimes laugh that
anybody can be a marketer because people think it is just coming up with a slogan
or tagline or even less. Obviously, it is far more than that”
The above response suggests that CEOs may not be adequately familiar with marketing
and this lack of familiarity could hurt the efforts of long tenured CMOs. In addition,
respondents also indicated that at times the working style of CMOs and CEOs may be
incompatible. As one executive puts it:
“My sense is that the CMO needs to adapt styles and communication to the
personality of the CEO. The biggest challenges (CMOs and CEOs) are getting on
the same page regarding the role of marketing and building mutual trust.
Ultimately, the CMO, should work with the CEO on a more strategic level. But
that kind of trust has to be earned through success and experience”
Thus, familiarity and similarity of working styles between CMOs and CEOs provides
marketing efforts a greater opportunity to succeed. Respondents also indicated that lack
of CEO-CMO familiarity results in CEOs viewing CMOs as agents for executing shortterm marketing campaigns. We asked follow-up questions on whether certain CEO types
were more prone to stabilizing (or destabilizing) marketing efforts within the
organization. Multiple respondents noted that CEOs with broader career experiences do
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not possess an in-depth understanding of marketing and are an impediment for marketing
program stability. One of the executives observed that:
“One of the biggest issues is that most CEOs think whatever they know translates
to understanding marketing which is not necessarily the case. For example, we
have a CEO that understands retail lead generation for the mass market. However,
our business model is the opposite. So, there is frequent questioning why we are
not using the mass market lead generation tools which are costly and will not
bring about the targeted results everyone would like.”
Thus, CEOs with broader experience might expect CMOs to pursue marketing strategies
from different industries without recognizing that marketing initiatives are context driven
and not necessarily portable. In summary, the field interviews pointed to three CEO
related challenges faced by CMOs in improving firm performance. The challenges that
were mentioned by multiple respondents are i) CEO familiarity with marketing, ii) CEO
familiarity with the working style of the CMO and iii) CEO career experience breadth.
1.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Marketing scholars have focused for some time on tracing the impact of
marketing on financial metrics as opposed to product-market metrics such as volume
sales or margins. A seminal paper by Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey (1998) notes that
while the shareholder impact of marketing through higher revenues or lower costs is
well-recognized, the role of marketing in creating shareholder wealth through lower
working capital needs is still not understood. More recently, Rao and Bharadwaj (2008)
lay out a foundation for the impact of marketing actions on total shareholder wealth and
show that this impact is the sum of two wealth effects: a stock price effect and a released
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working capital effect. The argument is that the working capital requirements for two
marketing initiatives that have the same net present value could be quite different. Thus,
marketing initiatives could release working capital to investors over and above its impact
on net present value.
The substantial rise in the number of CMOs appointed in firms has spurred
research on the relationship between CMOs and financial performance. To date, this line
of research has produced somewhat inconsistent results on the CMO effect. Most of this
prior research has focused on examining whether the presence (or absence) of CMOs
impacts Tobin’s Q. Our central thesis is that tenure of CMOs is as important (if not more)
in explaining financial performance because even when a firm has a CMO in place, firm
performance may not necessarily improve if there are significant and frequent changes to
marketing programs. Further, we argue that CMOs with greater tenure reduce the
information asymmetry with investors and lower cost of capital. This reduction in cost of
capital could be significant and offset the positive stock price effects, which arguably
accrues because of short CMO tenures.
Building on these insights, we develop a conceptual framework that delineates the
direct impact of CMO tenure on firm cost of capital and an indirect impact through brand
equity. Further, using a contingency perspective, we argue that the relationship between
CMO tenure and brand equity varies based on the extent of CMO-CEO fit. Synthesizing
insights from the in-depth field interviews, we propose that the relationship between
CMO tenure and brand equity is contingent on a) CEO marketing experience, b) CMOCEO prior same-firm experience and c) CEO general ability.
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1.2.1 CMO Tenure and Brand Equity
Researchers have noted that marketing actions contribute to shareholder value by
developing relational market based assets such as brand equity which have the effect of
accelerating cash flows and/or reducing volatility of cash flows (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and
Bonfrer 2011; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). Accordingly, we expect CMO
tenure to impact brand equity. We conceptualize brand equity as a customer based metric
that reflects the customer’s perceptions of the value of the brand. The perceptions
encompass the customer’s assessment of how relevant the brand is in its category, how
distinct the brand is, how familiar they are with the brand and the extent to which the
brand is liked.
Extant research in marketing recognizes the idea of a brand equity chain and that
marketing programs and other company actions form the controllable antecedents to the
brand equity chain (Keller and Lehmann 2003; 2006). Further, the amount of financial
investment committed to the marketing program does not necessarily guarantee brand
equity creation. Toward this end, the firm’s actions, rather than the investments made,
have a strong multiplier effect on brand equity. The actions impact the clarity and
consistency/integration of the marketing program. In other words, brand equity is likely
to be shaped by the extent to which current marketing programs are consistent. Eric Eden,
a senior marketing executive at Cvent, noted, “My experience is that a lot of initiatives
take years to put in place, so tenure is important. It can make a big economic difference
in profit and growth. Over time you can learn what really works and optimize,” (Cardona
2015). Building on these insights, we argue that because short and long tenured CMOs
pursue different actions, CMO tenure is an important antecedent of brand equity.
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Although previous research on CEOs suggests that hiring new executives renews
strategic focus (Adams 2005; Miller 1991), the relatively shorter tenures of CMOs
underscored in business reports present unique challenges for brands. Greater pressure of
accountability for the marketing function paradoxically perpetrates changes that are
counterproductive to brand health. New CMOs often seek new strategies, get rid of PR
and advertising firms, disrupt current marketing campaigns and continuity in marketing
messages (Zmuda and Parekh 2013). Katherine Stone, a senior Coca-Cola marketing
executive echoes this sentiment: “Usually, the new CMO gets rid of everything the prior
guy championed.... A lot of things get thrown away, which wastes time and money.” The
qualitative insights from our field interviews corroborates this sentiment and suggests
that CMOs are frequently hired for implementing a specific tactic/campaign, the shine
begins to wear off within a short period, and they are replaced. Therefore, CMOs with
shorter tenures are likely to be detrimental to maintaining or improving brand equity. In
contrast, we expect relatively longer tenured CMOs to be more able to balance market
changes with continuity and propel brand performance. Based on these insights, we
propose the following baseline hypothesis:
H1: Higher the CMO tenure, higher the brand equity.
1.2.2 CMO Tenure and Brand Equity: The Moderating Impact of Prior CEO
Marketing Experience
Previous research has used the notion of shared mental models to explain team
performance (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse 1993). The shared mental model
framework explains how teams adapt to changing conditions--that is, how teams can
quickly and efficiently adjust their strategy "on the fly." Further, team members may need
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to share many mental models pertaining to multiple aspects of the job. Marketing is a
boundary spanning activity that requires cooperation with other top management team
(TMT) members, such as CEOs, CFOs, and CIOs. The CEO’s marketing experience is
one such aspect that provides familiarity with the task at hand. When team members have
similar prior functional experience, communication is easier, positively impacting team
performance (Simons, Pelled, and Smith 1999; Smith et al. 1994). Additionally, shared
functional expertise has been shown to lead to easier conflict resolution (Auh and
Menguc 2005; Gatignon and Xuereb 1997) which should positively impact performance
by enabling efficient decision making.
When the CEO has marketing experience, they are more likely to not only
understand the importance of marketing but also understand the language of marketing
and set realistic expectations for the CMO. Studies have noted that firms with a
marketing CEO tend to prioritize marketing, highlighting consistency and collaboration
of marketing decision-making (Whitler 2017). Such CEOs are likely to grant CMOs the
authority within the C-suite to garner the necessary support (i.e., financial, product
development) from other TMT members to grow marketing assets. One of the key
challenges in long tenured CMOs being able to pursue brand building activities is
whether CEOs have the patience for return on investments in marketing to accrue. We
expect CEOs with marketing experience to be relatively more patient with marketing
programs because they are more likely to consider spending on marketing as an
investment and not as an expense. As such, CEOs with marketing experience might
allocate greater marketing budgets to CMOs and be more patient awaiting results, thereby
nurturing brand assets. These advantages from the shared functional background with
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CEO should provide the longer tenured CMO the latitude to improve brand performance.
Consequently, we propose:
H1a: The positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity is stronger
when the CEO has prior marketing experience.
1.2.3 CMO Tenure and Brand Equity: The Moderating Impact of Same-Firm Prior
Experience
In addition to shared mental models about the task, other aspects such as how well
members work together also influences team performance. In the context of TMTs, an
executive’s prior work experiences shape his/her way of thinking and interacting with
others (Zajac and Westphal 1996). When TMT members have shared executive
experiences, such as both having worked for the same firm in the past (regardless of
whether they worked there concurrently), greater trust and mutual expectation should
result from shared learning experiences. The presence of same-firm prior experience is
likely to result in a degree of working-style familiarity between the CEO and CMO.
Familiarity with members has been shown to improve productivity by facilitating
coordination and integration of team member efforts and better decision making
(Goodman and Garber 1988; Jehn and Shah 1997). However, some research finds that
familiarity between team members may also have harmful effects on team performance.
A high level of familiarity between team members fosters pressures for unanimity that in
turn can suppress the expression of vital alternative perspectives and impair group
decisions (Harrison et al. 2003).
We expect the shared experience of having worked at the same firm previously to
be beneficial for brand performance for the following reasons. First, we do not expect the
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possible negative effects of high familiarity to damper the CMOs ability to maintain
strong brand equity because our measure is not a measure of the degree of overlap at the
prior firm. Second, since the marketing function faces the challenge of demonstrating
accountability because returns on investments take time to accrue, we expect that trust
and mutual expectations will prevail due to familiarity with the shared learning
experiences gained from having worked at the same firm previously. CEOs familiar with
CMOs should be aware of the CMOs working style and past marketing efforts and should
be more trusting of the CMOs ability. This “head start” should enable the CMO to make
more efficient decisions about marketing programs and improve brand equity. In contrast,
when the CEO does not have prior familiarity with CMO, continuity of marketing
programs is likely to get impeded because of lack of understanding of the CMO’s
perspective. Thus, we expect:
H1b: The positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity is stronger
when the CEO and CMO have same-firm prior experience.
1.2.4 CMO Tenure and Brand equity: The Moderating Impact of CEO General Ability
It is known that the career experiences of CEOs influence corporate decisions and
performance (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Malmendier and Tate 2005). Previous
research examines the job histories of executives and classifies them on a general ability
continuum (Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos 2013). CEOs with more general ability (i.e.,
generalists) have broader skills that are portable across several industries compared to
CEOs with less general ability (Murphy and Zábojník 2004; 2007). Generalist CEOs earn
a wage premium in the labor market because they are more growth oriented and are
expected to adapt better to technology and industry shocks than specialist CEOs
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(Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos 2013). However, generalist CEOs also have superfluous
knowledge or lack specialized knowledge of other functional areas.
We argue that generalist CEOs pose significant impediments for the CMO tenure
and brand performance relationship. As noted before, longer tenure allows CMOs to
build consistency in marketing messaging and develop a comprehensive marketing
strategy with long term objectives. Longer tenured CMOs are able nurture marketing
assets like brands through their superior understanding of markets and customers. This
specialized knowledge increases the efficiency of investments in brand building over the
course of a CMOs’ tenure. However, generalist CEOs are known to be growth oriented,
disruptive and challenging of the status quo (Brockman, Lee, and Salas 2016; Custódio,
Ferreira, and Matos 2013). We argue that because generalist CEOs have a superfluous
knowledge of marketing, they are more likely to view it as a short-term tool for growth,
negatively impact brand equity. Prior research suggests that when managers have
different mental models, such as in the case of a generalist CEO and functional specialist
(i.e., CMO), marketing decision making suffers from inconsistencies (Challagalla,
Murtha, and Jaworski 2014; Wind 2006). These inconsistencies may therefore weaken
the positive impact of CMO tenure on brand equity. Thus, we propose:
H1c: The positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity is weaker
when the CEO has more general ability.
1.2.5 CMO Tenure and Cost of Capital
As noted before, we expect CMO tenure to be negatively related to the firm’s cost
of capital. Cost of capital refers to the rate of return expected by shareholders and debtholders and it reflects the stakeholder’s assessment of firm riskiness. Although firms have
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multiple stakeholders (e.g., customers, employees, suppliers), we focus on two key
stakeholders, equity holders and debt holders. An increase in cost of capital represents an
increase in the riskiness of the firm. Firms which are viewed as having risky investments
are penalized by investors with a higher cost of capital. As cost of capital increases,
strategic investment opportunities for the firm could change. Higher cost of capital may
damage the firms’ future growth potential and even threaten its survival (Easley and
O’Hara 2004).
We expect CMO tenure to impact cost of capital through the mechanisms of
greater investor attention and superior brand performance. First, we expect CMO tenure
to have a direct effect on cost of capital because it is likely to reduce information
asymmetry with investors and increase the salience of the firm’s stocks. Past research in
finance has shown that for investors, attention is a scarce resource and that they tend to
invest in stocks with which they are familiar (Huberman 2001; Lou 2014). As noted
before, long tenured CMOs are likely to better leverage investments in advertising to
build consistent and clear marketing messages, raising the knowledge and understanding
of the brand—a key component of brand equity. This continuity in marketing efforts is
likely to solidify the investor’s familiarity and confidence with the firm’s securities. A
better understanding of the firm’s marketing trajectory should increase the breadth of
ownership of the firm’s stock as well as improve stock liquidity (Chemmanur and Yan
2010; Fehle, Tsyplakov, and Zdorovtsov 2005; Lou 2014).
In addition to the direct effect on cost of capital, we also expect CMO tenure to
impact cost of capital though brand equity. Past research has examined the relationship
between brand metrics and firm risk measures such as systematic risk, working capital
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requirements and found support for a negative relationship (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer
2011; Rao, Bharadwaj, and Hanssens 2017). The primary reasons listed for risk reduction
are stronger brand loyalty (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001) which results in repeat
purchases (Keller and Lehmann 2006) and lower consumer price sensitivity resulting
from higher quality (Aaker and Jacobson 1994). These benefits of higher equity brands
should buffer it from adverse macroeconomic shocks and lower the operating shortfall for
firms in uncertain economic states. These arguments suggest that long tenured CMOs
should be able to improve brand equity and lower the firm’s cost of capital. Accordingly,
we advance the following hypotheses:
H2a: Higher the CMO tenure, lower the cost of capital.
H2b: Brand equity mediates the effect of CMO tenure on cost of capital.

1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1.3.1 Data
The data for the study was assembled from numerous sources. The sample of
CMOs was originally drawn from the CMOSONTHEMOVE data source for the period
2004-2013. Since we are interested in CMO tenure and because this database collects and
reports press releases about CMO appointments, it was an appropriate source to start data
collection. The firms in the initial sample are in the top quartile of their industries with
respect to revenues and total assets. This data source documents changes in CMO and
CMO appointments for primarily business-to-consumer firms in the United States. CMOs
in our sample refer to marketing executives that have direct reporting relationships with
CEOs. We are focused on CMOs with a direct reporting relationship because we are
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interested in studying firms that are committed to and value marketing, as evidenced by
C-level access (Cardona 2015). As such, CMOs who report directly to the CEO are more
likely to have managerial discretion and decision-making authority opposed to CMOs
who do not report to the CEO. Since we are interested in studying the effect CMO tenure
has on brand equity, the focus on CMOs that report to the CEO is paramount. A typical
CMO move announcement identifies the new marketing executive joining a firm and the
old marketing executive being replaced. To operationalize CMO tenure, we searched
press releases and news announcements to gather information on the date when the new
CMO exited the firm and when the old CMO was appointed to the position. We followed
this procedure to identify CMOs with direct reporting relationships to CEOs and their
tenure for all firms in the initial set between 2004 and 2013. We focus on firms that
primarily operate as business-to-consumer firms because we are interested in identifying
the impact of CMO tenure on brand equity. As such, a focus on firms that advertise more
heavily, such as business-to-consumer firms, is appropriate given our research interests.
We chose to focus on a ten-year period between 2004 and 2013 because data on CMO
moves is more readily available from 2004. Further, focusing on a longer period allows
us to capture multiple CMO transitions within firms and disentangle CMO-specific,
CEO-specific and firm-specific factors influencing CMO tenure. The filters applied to the
initial set of firms is as follows. We retained firms if there was objective information that
the firm did not have a CMO in place for a year or period. For example, in some cases,
the CMO appointment/exit news report indicated that a firm was creating a CMO
position for the first time. In other cases, the CMO role was vacant for a period related to
the replacement search process. While succession planning is common with the CEO, it
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is less common for CMO roles (Whitler 2018). So, we kept these firms in our sample
because there was no ambiguity as to the identity of the CMO. For approximately 20% of
the firms in our sample, there was ambiguity about the identity of the CMO for a subset
of the sample period. We dropped these firms from the sample because including
observations where ambiguity exists about the identity of the CMO could lead to biased
results. Finally, we dropped twelve firms which had CMOs in place for 10 years or more
to avoid undue influence from outliers. Using these filters, we assembled a final sample
of 125 firms between 2004 and 2013 (i.e., 1250 firm-year observations) that
unambiguously had a CMO in place or had no CMO position. In this sample, there are
237 firm-year observations in which there was no CMO in place. Our final sample of
1250 firm-year observations corresponds to 304 CMOs. It is worth noting that 40 CMOs
moved to firms within the sample implying that our sample is comprised of 264 unique
CMOs.
1.3.2 Measures
CMO tenure. The focal variable in our study is operationalized as the number of
months in each firm-year observation between the CMO’s time of appointment and exit.
Brand equity. Data on brand equity was sourced from BAV (Brand Asset
Valuator) Consulting. BAV conducts the largest study of brands and consumers with data
from over 680,000 consumers from over 60 countries from the past 15 years. The brand
valuator data has been utilized in several recent marketing studies (Larkin 2013; Mizik
2014) and is shown to be positively correlated with firm performance. We utilize BAV’s
brand asset measure as our measure of brand equity, which has been noted as an
appropriate measure of brand equity (Keller and Lehmann 2006). The measure reflects
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both brand strength (relevance and differentiation) and brand stature (esteem and
knowledge). For firms that contain multiple brands, we average the brand equity score
across all brands under the parent firm.
Cost of capital. Our dependent measure is the firm’s cost of capital calculated
using the weighted average cost of capital (Copeland, Weston, and Shastri 2005, pp. 524534). To compute this measure, we first estimated the cost of equity using the capital
asset pricing model. Following this, we estimated the before-tax cost of debt as the
interest expense paid divided by the sum of all interest-bearing debt. We then weighted
the cost of equity and debt by the proportion of equity and debt, respectively, to get the
weighted average cost of capital. We collected data on the proportion of debt and equity
and cost of debt from COMPUSTAT. Data on the risk-free rate and market premium
were collected from Fama French & Liquidity Factors database. Information on the
firm’s beta were collected from CRSP and Yahoo! Charts.
CEO prior marketing experience. Prior literature suggests that the marketing
experience of CEOs might facilitate more efficient decision making in the realm of
marketing (Buyl et al. 2011). Accordingly, we include a dummy variable that captures
whether the CEO has prior work experience in a marketing function. Data on this
variable was collected from Corporate Affiliations and executive profiles. We
operationalize this as a dummy variable because the length of time for which a CEO
served in a marketing function was not readily available from executive profiles. We
examined alternate specifications of CMO prior marketing experience, including whether
the marketing experience was more recent (i.e., one of the most recent two positions) or
whether the marketing experience was strategic (i.e., has an EVP title associated with the
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role). The results using these specifications did not change the results and analyses
related to these are omitted for brevity.
Same-firm prior experience. We operationalized ‘Same-Firm Prior Experience’
using a dummy variable that reflects whether the CMO and CEO had worked for the
same organization in the past. It is worthwhile to note that this does not capture whether
the CEO and CMO worked at the same firm at the same time but rather captures whether
they have both worked at firm ‘X’ in the past. We do not observe instances in the data
where CMO and CEO share multiple same-firm prior experience and we are not able to
capture the dates related to prior work experience, so this variable is dummy coded. Also,
we are primarily interested in this variable from the standpoint of how the executive’s
mindset and thinking is shaped. So, looking at whether the CEO and CMO previously
both worked at the same firm in the past as a dummy variable adequately captures this
notion. This data was collected from Corporate Affiliations and executive biographies.
CEO/CMO general ability. Following past research (see Custódio, Ferreira and
Matos 2013), we relied on five proxies to capture the breadth of skills held by the
CEO/CMO.
1. Number of positions: This measure is based on the number of past titles held
by the CEO/CMO. CEOs/CMOs with more titles, and hence more positions,
should have been exposed to different organizational areas.
2. Number of firms: This measure captures the number of firms for which the
CEO/CMO worked in the past. Executives who work for multiple firms are
exposed to a variety of organizational knowledge bases, allowing for the
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development of more general skills than those who have only worked for one
firm and hence possessing firm-specific skills.
3. Number of industries: This variable measures the number of industries in
which the CEO/CMO has worked, based on the four-digit SIC code. The more
industries in which an executive has worked, the greater variety of
environment he or she has been exposed to, contributing to his/ her general
skills base.
4. Prior CEO/CMO experience: This is a dummy variable that captures whether
the CEO/CMO held a CEO/CMO position previously. CEOs/CMOs who have
held a similar position in the past are more likely to be aware of the skills
needed to perform in the current position.
5. Conglomerate experience: This is a dummy variable set to 1 if the CEO/CMO
has worked for a multi-division firm. In general, prior experience in a business
with different operating segments could expose executives to varying business
conditions and help develop skills that could be transferred to different
business contexts.
We collected data on these five observable variables for CEOs/CMOs from the Corporate
Affiliations database and annual company filings. As in prior research (Custódio, Ferreira
and Matos 2013), to increase the explanatory power while reducing multicollinearity and
minimizing the measurement error, we performed a principal components analysis on the
five variables, extracting a unidimensional general ability variable. Note that these five
indicants are standardized before extracting principal components. Higher scores on the
extracted component imply higher generalist skills for the CEO/CMO. By controlling for
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CMO general ability, we capture the breadth and depth of a CMOs work experience
which contributes to the CMOs ability to impact brand equity.
We also collected data on several control variables related to CMO and CEO
characteristics. Data on CMO gender, whether the CMO had a MBA degree and whether
the CMO was an internal promotion or an external hire were collected by coding press
releases and executive biographies. It is possible that CMOs with higher titles have been
employed in the firm for a longer time and therefore expected to stay longer as well. We
examined the titles of CMOs to identify their structural influence in the organization. We
examined whether a marketing officer held the title of an ‘Executive Vice-President’
(EVP). Although firms are likely to differ with respect to the titles accorded to
executives, CMOs with EVP titles could potentially have higher tenures. The data for this
variable was collected from CMO hiring news reports and executive biographies.
A source of uncertainty for CMOs (and other C-suite officers) is the likelihood of
management changes when a new CEO is appointed. New CEOs often seek to alter the
direction and focus of the organization and hire new TMT members to pursue that
objective. We collected data on whether the firm had a new CEO by coding the firm’s
10K and annual reports. We also collected data on firm and industry characteristics as
they are expected to influence a firm’s decision to hire and keep a CMO. Consistent with
previous research (Nath and Mahajan 2008), we included advertising intensity as a
predictor of CMO tenure. Data on this variable was procured from COMPUSTAT. It is
also known that the marketing function is frequently under fire when performance is
lower and appreciated more when performance is higher. We included the firm’s earnings
(before interest and tax) in the previous year as a proxy for firm performance. The data
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for this variable was obtained from COMPUSTAT. Finally, we collected data on the
number of analysts following a firm from the I/B/E/S database. This variable captures the
extent of information asymmetry between firms and the investment community. The
variable operationalization and data sources are presented in Table 1.2.
1.3.3 Model Development
Endogeneity of CMO Tenure. Although our principal interest is in testing the
impact of CMO tenure on brand equity and cost of capital, firms may be strategic about
when to change CMOs. Therefore, ignoring this endogeneity is likely to lead to biased
estimates and possibly erroneous conclusions. For instance, some firms and CEOs might
view the marketing function as a tactical role and seek to replace them on a regular basis.
This endogeneity problem is frequently encountered in applied work and addressed using
instrumental variables. We use CMO gender as an instrument to create exogenous
variation in CMO tenure. Past research in management and economics suggests that
work-life balance poses greater challenges for women than men (Dreher 2003).
Consistent with this stream of research, we expect CMO tenure for women to be shorter
than for men. However, there is no theoretical basis to expect CMO gender to be
significantly related to brand equity and cost of capital. Thus, CMO gender satisfies the
theoretical requirements of being a valid instrument in our setting.
We model CMO tenure as a Weibull distribution, W (λ, p) where λ is the scale
parameter and p is the shape parameter. Further, to interpret the estimates in terms of
time to CMO exit, we use an accelerated failure time (AFT) metric. It is worthwhile to
note that by modeling this with an AFT metric, we can capture the predicted length of
CMO tenure. This model is not capturing the risk or hazard rate for a CMO no longer
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being in the CMO role at time t. The duration of CMOs in an AFT metric can be
expressed as follows:

CMOTEN jt = exp[μ + α1CMOGENDER j + α 2CMOMBA j + α3CMOINTERN j + α4CMOEVPTITLE jt
+α5CEOCHANGEit + α6CEOMKTG k + α6 FIRMEARNINGSit + α7 ADINTENit + α8-9 INDUSTRY
Equation 1

+α10-18YEAR + σε jt ]

Where CMOTEN = Tenure of CMO ‘j’ at time ‘t’, CMOGENDER = gender of CMO ‘j’,
CMOMBA = MBA degree of CMO ‘j’, CMOINTERN = internal or external hire of
CMO ‘j’, CMOEVPTITLE = executive VP title of CMO ‘j’ at time ‘t’, CEOCHANGE =
whether firm ‘i’ had a new CEO at time ‘t’, CEOMKTG = whether CEO ‘k’ had
marketing experience, FIRMEARNINGS = earnings of firm ‘i’' at time ‘t’, ADINTEN =
advertising intensity of firm ‘i’ at time ‘t’, INDUSTRY = industry specific fixed effects
and YEAR = year specific fixed effects. The parameter estimates are α1- α18 and εjt is
the error term.
Equation (1) could be misspecified if unobservable firm characteristics influence
CMO selection and CMO duration. To account for this possibility, we use clustered
robust standard errors (Liang and Zeger 1986). The clustered standard errors are larger
than those obtained from conventional estimation thereby making the hypotheses tests
more conservative. The clustered robust standard errors also control for firm-specific
heteroskedasticity (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). We note that employing
clustered standard errors by firms is equivalent to modeling firm-specific random effects
for the intercept (Moulton 1986).
To test the effect of CMO tenure on brand equity, we use predicted CMO tenure
scores from equation (1). Brand equity is then modeled as a linear combination of CMO
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tenure, CEO characteristics and control variables such as industry and year specific
effects.
ˆ
BEQUITY = β +β CMOTEN
+β CEOMKT +β CEOCMOPRFIRMEXP +β CEOGENAB
it 0 1
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kt 3
kt 4
kt
ˆ
ˆ
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+β CMOTEN
*CEOMKTG +β CMOTEN
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5
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8
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Equation  2 

ˆ
Where BEQUITY = brand equity for firm ‘i’ at time ‘t’, CMOTEN
jt is the predicted
CMO duration from equation (1), CEOMKT = whether the CEO has prior marketing
experience, CEOCMOPRFIRMEXP = whether the CMO and CEO worked at the same
firm at a point in his/her career, CEOGENAB = general ability of the CEO ‘k’ at time ‘t’,
CMOGENAB general ability of the CMO ‘j’ at time ‘t’, it is the random error. As in
(1), we use clustered robust standard errors to estimate equation (2).
To test the effect of brand equity on cost of capital, we use predicted brand equity
scores from equation (2). Cost of capital is then modeled as a linear combination of brand
equity, CMO tenure, CEO characteristics and control variables such as SGA intensity,
total assets, analyst coverage, industry and year specific effects.

ˆ
ˆ
CoCit = δ0 + δ1BEQUITY
it + δ 2 CMOTEN jt + δ3CEOTEN kt + δ 4SGAINTENit + δ5 ASSETSit
+δ6 ANALYCOVit + δ7-8INDUSTRY + δ9-17 YEAR + ψit

Equation  3 

Where CoC = cost of capital of firm ‘i’ at time ‘t’, CEOTEN = tenure of CEO ‘k’ at time
‘t’, SGAINTEN = sales, general, and administrative expense intensity of firm ‘i’ at time
‘t’, ASSETS = total assets of firm ‘i’ at time ‘t’ and ANALYCOV= analyst coverage of
firm ‘i’ at time ‘t’.
There are a few econometric issues pertaining to the error structure in equations (2)
and (3) which need to be accounted for. CMOs tend to switch between firms in our
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sample. This migration of CMOs leads to possibly contemporaneous correlation between
cross-sectional units. Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p.702) suggest that “NT correlated
observations have less information than NT independent observations.” Thus, ignoring
the error correlation between cross-sectional units could lead to erroneous conclusions.
Similarly, there could be first order autocorrelation in the brand equity and cost of capital
measures. As suggested by Creel and Farell (1996), we use feasible generalized least
square estimation (XTGLS in STATA 13) to estimate equations (2) and (3) with crosssectional dependence, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
1.4 RESULTS
1.4.1 Model Free Evidence
Our sample is comprised of CMOs and CEOs in the business-to-consumer space.
The distribution of firms by two-digit SIC codes is reported in Table 1.3. As seen in
Table 1.3, 38% of the firms in the sample are in the retailing industry (e.g., general
merchandise & food stores, clothing retailers and restaurants) whereas 37% of the firms
are in the manufacturing industry (e.g., sanitary products, news publishing, cosmetics,
shaving products, computers and telecommunications). The remaining 25% of the firms
in the sample are in the consumer services industry (e.g., banks/financial services, hotels,
airlines, car rentals, cruise lines).
The summary statistics for the variables appear in Table 1.4. As seen in Table 1.4,
the mean tenure for CMOs is approximately 35 months. However, we find considerable
variation in CMO tenure across industries in our sample. For example, CMOs for
financial services, hotel and car rental industries (e.g., E-Trade, JP Morgan, MET Life,
Hilton, and Hertz) have durations in the 90% percentile (i.e., average duration exceeding
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66 months) whereas CMOs in the retailing industries (e.g., Arby’s, Einstein Noah,
Family Dollar and Hancock) have durations in the 20% percentile (i.e., average duration
less than 20 months). CMO tenure also appears to have increased in our data period from
an average duration of 40 months in 2004 to 52 months in 2013. The CEO tenure variable
shows relatively less variation and the mean CEO tenure is 66 months. The average brand
equity score is about 71.
1.4.2 Model-based Results: Predictors of CMO Tenure
Though our primary interest is not in predicting CMO tenure, we need to account
for the endogeneity of CMO tenure. Therefore, we use a duration model to estimate CMO
tenure. Not much theory or empirical evidence is available to predict the shape of the
CMO tenure process. Therefore, to overcome misspecification bias, we compare several
distributions. These distributions are continuous because CMO exit could occur at any
time. We estimate AFT models incorporating exponential, Weibull, log-logistic, and
Gamma CMO tenure distributions. Since the Weibull distribution offers the best fit based
on Bayesian Information Criteria statistic, we model CMO tenure as a Weibull regression
with an accelerated failure time metric. The results of the determinants of CMO tenure
appear in Table 1.5. The duration dependence parameter is positive and significant (2.20,
p<.01). Therefore, the length of time a CMO has been in his/her job, affects the
likelihood of CMO turnover or exit.
The results in Table 1.5 suggest that the tenure of female CMOs is shorter than
that of their male counterparts (-.16, p<.05). Likewise, we find CMOs holding MBAs to
have shorter tenure (-.19, p<.01). Executives who have MBAs may have more general
knowledge about other functional areas (Murphy and Zábojník 2004) and thus, greater
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mobility. We do not find the effect of internal versus external CMOs on tenure to be
significant (.05, p>.1). Additionally, tenure is longer for CMOs who also hold ‘Executive
Vice President’ titles (.21, p<.01). The results also suggest that when firm earnings (i.e.,
EBIT) is higher, CMO tenure is also higher (1.5x 10-5, p<.05). This finding is in line with
anecdotal evidence, which suggests that the marketing leadership and function are under
greater scrutiny when firm performance is lower. Regarding the control variables, the
results suggest that CMOs in retail industries have shorter tenure (-.3, p<.01) than those
in financial and service industries. The shorter tenure of retail CMOs might reflect the
uncertainty that online retailing has wrought over the industry.
1.4.3 CMO Tenure, Cost of Capital and Brand equity
H1 predicts that CMO tenure has a positive impact on brand equity. As seen in
Column I of Table 1.6, the impact of CMO tenure on brand equity is positive and
significant (.065, p<.01). Furthermore, as seen in Column VI of Table 1.6, the main effect
of CMO tenure on brand equity remains positive and significant (.094, p<.01) when
interactions are not included in the model. H1 is supported. This finding is consistent
with prior research, which suggests that clarity and consistency in marketing are
controllable antecedents of brand equity (Keller and Lehmann 2003).
We next turn to the moderating hypotheses. In support of H1a, we find that the
interaction between CMO tenure and CEO prior marketing experience on brand equity is
positive and significant albeit at the 10% level (.03, p<.10). The direct effect of CEO
prior marketing experience on brand equity is not significant (p>.10). Collectively, the
findings imply that longer tenured CMOs improve brand performance when CEOs have
prior marketing experience. However, CEOs with prior marketing experience may not
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have the needed expertise to improve brand performance by themselves. To gain a better
understanding of these findings, we performed additional analyses.2 Recall that we
operationalized ‘CEO Marketing Experience’ as whether the CEO had worked in a
marketing function in the past. We created a new dummy measure of CEO marketing
experience to distinguish between recent marketing experience versus distant marketing
experience. We find that the interaction effect of CMO tenure and CEO marketing
experience continues to be positive and significant. However, the direct effect of CEO
marketing experience on brand equity turns out to be positive and significant (p<.05).
These analyses suggest that increases in CMO tenure can realize superior brand
performance when CEOs have a marketing background.
H1b hypothesized that the positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand
equity is stronger when the CMO and CEO have same-firm prior experience. As seen in
Column I of Table 1.6, the direct effect of same-firm prior experience on brand equity is
not significant (p>.10) while the interaction effect of CMO tenure and is positive and
significant (.05, p<.05). H3c is thus supported. This finding implies that same-firm prior
experience of CEOs and CMOs provides a shared understanding and helps CMOs to
improve brand performance as their tenure increases.
H1c predicts that the positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity
will be weaker for CEOs with greater general ability. We find the direct effect of CEO
general ability on brand equity to be positive (1.81, p<.01). Consistent with H1c, we find
the interaction of CMO tenure and CEO general ability to be negative and significant (.01, p<.05). This suggests that CMOs who work under CEOs with more general ability
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may face challenges in maintaining consistency in marketing programs, resulting in
negative consequences to the brand. We controlled for the CMO’s general ability since
the breadth of career experience of the CMO may influence brand equity. We do not find
the impact of CMO general ability on brand equity to be significant (-.15, p>.1). We also
find the eight year-specific dummy variables to be positive relative to the base year of
2013. Regarding industry specific effects, we find that manufacturing (12.59, p<.01) and
retail industries (11.12 p<.01), have higher brand equity than financial and services
industries.
To test the effect of CMO tenure on cost of capital, we use predicted CMO tenure
scores from equation (1). H2a predicts that higher CMO tenure would lower the firm’s
cost of capital. The results reported in Column II of Table 1.6, show that CMO tenure is
negatively associated with cost of capital (-.00025, p<.01). H2a is supported. We
performed additional analyses to examine the robustness of this result. Recall that we
computed cost of capital as the weighted average cost of debt and equity. In additional
analyses, we tested for the effect of CMO tenure separately on cost of debt and equity.
These results appear in Columns III and IV of Table 1.6. We find that the effect of CMO
tenure on cost of equity is negative and significant and the effect on cost of debt to be
insignificant (p>.10). In addition, we also tested the effect of CMO tenure on the firm’s
systematic risk (beta) and find that it continues to load negatively at the 1% level
(Column V of Table 1.6). Collectively, we interpret these findings as evidence that longer
CMO tenure is viewed by investors as indicative of lower cash flow volatility and
reduced working capital requirements.
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The results suggest that the effect of CEO tenure on cost of capital is negative (4.0 x 10-5, p<.01). We find the regression estimate of SGA intensity on cost of capital to
be negative (-.048, p<.01), suggesting that more marketing expenses reduces information
asymmetry with investors. The effect of total assets on cost of capital is positive (5.85 x
10 -8, p<.01). Consistent with expectations, we find the impact of analyst coverage on
cost of capital to be negative and significant (-.0011, p<.01). Additionally, we do not find
the industry specific effects to be significant (p>.10).
To test H2b (i.e., the mediating role of brand equity), we use predicted brand
equity scores from equation (2). We test the effect of CMO tenure on firm cost of capital
in the presence of brand equity. As shown in Table 1.7, the effect of CMO tenure on firm
cost of capital is not significant in the presence of brand equity (p>.10). However, the
effect of brand equity on cost of capital is significant and negative (-.001, p<.01),
suggesting that higher levels of brand equity reduces the firm’s cost of capital. The
results provide support for H2b, suggesting that brand equity mediates the relationship
between CMO tenure and cost of capital. Therefore, the findings imply that CMO
tenure’s effect on cost of capital manifests through brand equity. Consistent with
expectations, we find CEO tenure to be also negatively related to cost of capital (-.00007,
p<.01). As in the direct effects model, SGA intensity is negatively related to cost of
capital (-.07, p<.01). In addition, we find total assets to be positively related to cost of
capital (6.96 x 10-8, p<.01) and analyst coverage to be negatively related to cost of capital
(-.0016, p<.01). Finally, the results suggest that retail has higher cost of capital than
financial and service industries (.01, p<.01).
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1.4.4 Additional Analyses
In this section, we discuss and report the results of a battery of additional analyses
conducted to evaluate whether our core evidence that CMO tenure increases brand equity
and reduces cost of capital is robust to other concerns of endogeneity and non-linear
effects of CMO tenure. Overall, the results from these validation checks reported in Table
1.8 are not materially different from those of the primary analysis.
Other Sources of Endogeneity. One concern in relation to the analysis is the
potential endogeneity because of omitted variables that may cloud the interpretation of
the relationship between CMO tenure and cost of capital. An alternate explanation for our
results is that CMO tenure and cost of capital could be driven by the firm’s desire for
higher growth. That is, firms seeking higher growth might strategically settle for shorter
CMO tenures and higher cost of capital. If so, the objective function of the firm could be
maximizing growth opportunities as opposed to lowering financing costs. Although this
possibility ignores the fact that firms that seek to maximize net present value without
consideration to the amount of capital deployed are likely to get displaced by competition
in the long-run (Rao and Bharadwaj 2008), we nonetheless performed additional analyses
to test this alternate explanation. We operationalized the firm’s growth potential using
Tobin’s Q. We then ran regressions to examine the impact of CMO tenure on the firm’s
Tobin’s Q. The results of these analyses are reported in Column I of Table 1.8. As seen in
Table 1.8, the impact of CMO tenure on Tobin’s Q is not statistically significant (p>.10).
This evidence rules out firm growth opportunities as an alternate explanation for our
findings.
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Another potential concern is one of reverse causality in which the firm’s cost of
capital may drive CMO tenure. The argument is that lower cost of capital may provide
slack resources to firms that could in turn be deployed to support marketing programs.
The additional resources may enable CMOs to perform better and, thus, lengthen their
tenure in the organization. While this explanation is theoretically possible, it is worth
noting that we already include firm earnings as a determinant of CMO tenure and use
predicted CMO tenure scores in our subsequent analyses. Therefore, we rule out reverse
causality from cost of capital to CMO tenure as a potential explanation for our findings.
Likewise, one could argue for a possible reverse causal effect from brand equity to CMO
tenure. That is, higher brand equity would lead to longer CMO tenures. This is not a
concern in our context because of the temporal separation between the CMO effect and
brand equity measure. In our setting, brand equity is measured at the end of the fiscal
year and the CMO tenure is measured from the time the executive is hired. For instance,
although we link CMO tenure at time ‘t’ to brand equity at time ‘t’ in our empirical
specifications, the CMO effect on marketing program temporally precedes the brand
equity measured at the end of the year. Therefore, the possibility of reverse causation
from brand equity to CMO tenure is not a serious threat to our findings.
Non-linear Effects of CMO Tenure. In this subsection, we test whether CMO
tenure has non-linear effects on brand equity. Specifically, we investigate the possibility
that CMO tenure has ceiling effects such that at higher levels of CMO tenure, brand
equity is adversely impacted. The reasoning is that as CMO tenure increases, marketing
programs might stagnate and get out of sync with customer needs. To test this effect, we
included a quadratic term for CMO tenure in the brand equity specification. The results
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of this analysis appear in Column II of Table 1.8. As seen in Table 1.8, although the
linear term of CMO tenure continues to be positive and significant (.07, p<.05), the
quadratic term for CMO tenure is not significant (p>.10). Therefore, while a non-linear
effect (inverted-U) of CMO tenure on brand equity seems theoretically plausible, this
effect is not borne out in our data possibly because tenure of CMOs is not adequately
long in our empirical setting.
1.5 DISCUSSION
Triggered by the ongoing discussion about the influence (or lack thereof) of
marketing and CMOs, we investigate whether CMO tenure impacts brand equity and
shareholder wealth through firm risk (i.e., cost of capital). We next outline the
implications of the study for marketing theory and practice.
1.5.1 Research Contributions
Our study makes three important contributions to marketing theory and research.
First, our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to investigate the impact of
CMO tenure on firm performance. We use cost of capital as our performance metric.
Extant research has thus far focused on examining whether the presence of CMOs in
firms influences firm performance (Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal 2015; Nath and
Mahajan 2008) and new venture funding (Homburg et al. 2014). By linking CMO tenure
to brand performance and cost of capital, our study generates valuable insights on how
CMOs can demonstrate accountability to top management and present a compelling case
for their longevity within the organization. In doing so, our study extends previous
research in important ways. In an influential paper, Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey
(1998) argue that marketers need to consider the effects of their actions on lowering
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volatility and vulnerability of cash flows and thereby reducing the firm’s risk and cost of
capital. More recently, the establishment of the Marketing Accountability Standards
Board (MASB) has expanded the investment-based outlook of marketing to
demonstrating greater accountability in the corporate boardroom (Kumar 2015). Despite
such advances, empirical research on the effects of marketing actions on metrics such as
working capital requirements remains scarce. Rao and Bharadwaj (2008) provide an
analytical roadmap to show that the effect of marketing initiatives on shareholder wealth
occurs through a stock price effect and a released working capital effect. They further
note that integration of concepts such as brand equity and customer equity into the
shareholder wealth equation offers the potential for deeper insights. Our study responds
to these calls for research by linking CMO tenure to brand equity and cost of capital.
Second, our study finds that brand equity mediates the impact of CMO tenure on
cost of capital. This finding is consistent with the notion that marketing actions impact
shareholder value through the creation of market-based assets (Srivastava, Shervani, and
Fahey 1998). Previous research also shows that brand metrics such as equity and quality
reduce the firm’s systematic and idiosyncratic risk (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer 2011).
Our study contributes to the marketing literature by identifying CMO tenure as an
important antecedent of brand equity. Our findings are also somewhat distinct from the
performance effects of CEO tenure. Research on upper echelons finds that as CEO tenure
increases, firm performance declines because of the CEO’s inability to keep pace with the
environment (Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick 2006; Miller 1991). In contrast, the
curvilinear impact of CMO tenure on brand equity was not supported in our study (only
the linear term is positive and significant, see Column II of Table 1.8). The theoretical
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implication is that stability of marketing executives in the C-suite is an important
precursor for managing brand equity.
Furthermore, our findings show that even though CMO tenure does not have an
impact on the stock price (measured by impact on Tobin’s Q), it does impact shareholder
wealth through a released working capital effect. The theoretical implication for
researchers is that CMO longevity needs to be evaluated based on returns generated for a
dollar of capital deployed. Research that focuses on articulating the value of CMOs based
on just stock price enhancements is likely to short-sell their influence on shareholder
wealth creation (Rao and Bharadwaj 2008). Our findings are similar in spirit to research
in finance and accounting that link corporate policies such as stock cross-listings and
corporate social responsibility to cost of capital (Hail and Leuz 2009; El Ghoul et al.
2011).
Third, our study identifies moderators for the CMO tenure-brand equity
relationship and offers valuable insights into the CMO-CEO interface. We find that the
marketing experience of the CEO strengthens the positive impact of CMO tenure on
brand equity. This finding is consistent with previous research which finds that team
members with shared functional background will excel at identifying and bundling the
distributed valuable pieces of functional information available in the TMT quickly into
purposeful, well targeted market offerings (Buyl et al. 2011). Likewise, we find that prior
same-firm experience of the CMO and CEO strengthens the positive relationship between
CMO tenure and brand equity. Broadly, our findings echo the view that top management
teams perform better when there are shared mental models amongst members. In our
context, CEO marketing experience and prior ties between the CEO and CMO appears to
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increase task and relationship familiarity, both of which are critical to ensuring CMO
longevity and improved brand performance.
We also find that CEOs who are generalists, or have more broad skills, weaken
the positive relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity. This finding is
consistent with the view that generalist CEOs are growth oriented and pursue more
acquisitions (Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos 2013). Their superficial knowledge of
marketing along with a stronger drive for growth perhaps makes them push for trajectory
changes frequently and thereby impede continuity in marketing efforts. The negative
moderating effect of CEO’s broad skills is inconsistent with research that finds that
exposure to more industries and functions would increase understanding and cooperation
with CMOs (Buyl et al. 2011). Our study should encourage future researchers to include
the general skills of the CEO in models that examine the tenure of marketing leaders.
1.5.2 Implications for Practice
Our study offers numerous insights for marketing practice. The CMO Council
conducted a survey of more than 1,000 C-level executives, including chief marketing
officers, to understand practitioner concerns about marketing accountability and
measurement. An overwhelming 80% of the marketing executives were unhappy with
their current ability to measure performance (Kumar 2015; Stewart 2009). Our findings
show that even when CMO tenure is not significantly related to Tobin’s Q, it has
economically meaningful effects of releasing working capital through lowering the cost
of capital. This finding should encourage marketing executives to demonstrate their value
to CEOs and CFOs by linking their actions to the released cash that is available for
outside investment. In other words, a solitary focus on demonstrating stock price
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enhancements might not paint a complete picture of the tenure effects of CMOs on
shareholder wealth creation.
Further, our finding that CMO tenure impacts cost of capital through brand equity
exhorts CMOs to bear in mind the impact of their efforts and actions on brand
performance. This implication is not trivial because with mounting pressure for
accountability, CMOs often pursue short-term growth that boosts cash flows but are not
necessarily beneficial for brand health. Echoing this sentiment, many marketing
executives often wonder whether CMOs are the best brand guardians given the rise of
short-termism amongst CEOs and CFOs (Chahal 2016). Our study suggests that by
linking CMO tenure to brand equity and cost of capital, marketers should be able to
address this dichotomy. A lower cost of capital should translate into a lower discount rate
and impact net present value. Therefore, CEOs need to emphasize brand building in the
CMO’s job description and ensure accountability by considering the wealth created in the
firm per dollar of capital invested.
Our study also provides valuable insights into CEO related factors, which enhance
or weaken the effect of CMO tenure on brand equity. We find that when CEOs have
marketing experience, the effect of CMO tenure on brand equity is strengthened. To
understand the managerial relevance of our moderating effects further, we conducted a
“What-If” analysis. Results of this analysis appear in Table 1.9. For this analysis, we
examined the impact of a 12-month increase in CMO tenure on brand equity and cost of
capital for different levels of our moderators. When CMO tenure is increased by 12
months, brand equity is higher and cost of capital is lower when the CEO has marketing
experience (brand equity = 71.30; cost of capital = 3.8%) as opposed to when the CEO
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does not have marketing experience (brand equity = 70.54; cost of capital = 4.1%).
Therefore, the difference in financing costs at different levels of CEO marketing
experience is .3%. Given that the average firm capital (equity + debt) is $31 billion, the
released working capital due to lower financing costs is $93 million.
We also find that the impact of CMO tenure on brand equity is strengthened when
CMOs and CEOs have prior same-firm experience. As before, we performed additional
analyses to quantify this effect. The results show that the impact of a 12-month increase
in CMO tenure on brand equity and cost of capital is greater when the CMO and CEO
have same-firm prior experience (brand equity = 73.92, cost of capital = 3.5%) opposed
to when the CMO and CEO have no same-firm prior experience (brand equity = 70.67,
cost of capital = 4%). This difference translates into a released working capital of $155
million. Prior ties between CMOs and CEOs have economically meaningful effects in
enabling CMOs with longer tenures to improve performance. Anecdotal reports that
CEOs hiring their “buddies” into the executive suite would stifle performance are not
validated by data in the context of CMOs. The implication for CEOs is that they should
leverage their network and hire CMOs with whom they have prior ties, as this can ease
frictions in the ongoing relationship.
Finally, the results show that the greatest threat to CMOs seeking consistency in
marketing programs is generalist CEOs. To quantify this effect, we examine the impact
of a 12-month increase in CMO tenure on brand equity at different levels of CEO general
ability. To do this, we create three levels of CEO general ability: low general ability,
average general ability and high general ability, by setting the CEO general ability
variable at 10%, 50% and 90% levels. The results of this analysis are reported in Table
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1.9. For low general ability, a 12-month increase in CMO tenure results in a cost of
capital of 3.1%. In contrast, a 12-month increase in CMO tenure for high general ability
yields a cost of capital of 5%. This 1.9% difference in financing costs translates into a
value of $589 million. This analysis shows that generalist CEOs pose a significant
impediment to the CMO’s ability to improve brand equity and lower cost of capital. The
implication is that CMOs working for CEOs with low general ability (i.e., specialist
CEOs) are in a better position to demonstrate their worth through brand performance and
cost of capital.
While our study offers valuable insights about the importance of CMO tenure, the
findings are not without limitations. First, the context of our analysis was limited to
primarily business-to-consumer firms. The finding that CMO tenure is beneficial from
the standpoint of improving brand equity and lowering cost of capital needs to be
interpreted with this caveat in mind. Our choice of examining business-to-consumer firms
was guided by business press reports that despite the importance of marketing in these
industries, tenure of CMOs varies greatly. Thus, caution is needed before generalizing
our findings to other settings. Second, because our primary interest was in understanding
the factors between the CEO and CMO that impacted the effect of CMO tenure on brand
equity and subsequently the firms cost of capital, we focused on CMOs who reported
directly to the CEO. This could bias the sample towards more powerful CMOs. As such,
results need to be interpreted with caution when applying to instances where the CMO
does not directly report to the CEO. Lastly, although we propose that CMO tenure
impacts brand equity positively because of greater continuity in marketing programs, we
are unable to explicitly measure this mechanism. Therefore, it is incorrect to directly
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attribute our findings to this mechanism. The challenge is that it is difficult to develop
reasonable proxies for marketing program continuity using secondary data. A promising
line of inquiry would be to use survey measures to explicitly measure these intermediate
outcomes.
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Table 1.1 An Overview of Previous Research on Chief Marketing Officers and Firm Performance
Study

CMO
Presence
√

CMO
Tenure
X

Performance
Effects
√

Boyd,
Chandy, and
Cunha, Jr.
(2010)
Homburg et
al. (2014)

√

X

√

√

X

√

Germann,
Ebbes, and
Grewal
(2015)

√

X

√

Nath and
Mahajan
(2017)

√

√

X

Current Study

√

√

√

Nath and
Mahajan
(2008)

Key Findings
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CMO presence has no impact on firm performance. Firms have a higher
propensity for CMO presence when firm is branded house, when CEO is
outsider and when TMT marketing experience, product differentiation and
innovation levels are high.
CMOs create less value when customer power is high. When CMO has more
role-specific experience and when prior firm performance is greater the
effect is attenuated; when CMO is insider and when firm is large, this affect
is intensified.
New ventures are more likely to receive funding when CMO has marketing
and industry experience and a respected educational background.
Competitive intensity positively moderates the relationship between industry
and prior start-up experience on the likelihood of receiving funding.
CMO presence positively impacts firm financial performance. Specifically,
their findings suggest that the performance (measured in terms of Tobin's q)
of the sample firms that employ a CMO is, on average, approximately 15%
greater than that of the sample firms that do not employ a CMO. This result
is robust to the type of model specification used
Factors that increase likelihood of CMO turnover include poor sales growth
and poor firm profitability. New CEO appointments enhances likelihood of
CMO turnover except when firm is highly profitable. CMO turnover has an
inverted U relationship with TMT marketing experience and CMO tenure.
Longer CMO tenure results in higher brand equity and reduces cost of capital
through its impact on brand equity. The impact of CMO tenure on brand
equity is strengthened when the CEO has prior marketing experience and
when the CEO and CMO have same-firm prior experience. CEO general
ability weakens the relationship between CMO tenure and brand equity.

Table 1.2 Variable Operationalization and Data Sources
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Measure
CMO Tenure

Variable
CMOTEN

Operationalization
Time in months from the CMO’s appointment until CMO Exit or
end of 2013.
Customer perceptions about the brand’s overall health

Brand equity

BEQUITY

Firm Cost of
Capital

CoC

(Proportion Equity*Cost of Equity) + (Proportion Debt*Cost of
Debt)

CEO Prior
Marketing
Experience

CEOMKT

Dummy variable indicating whether the CEO had experience in a
marketing role; 1= Marketing Experience, 0= Otherwise.

Same-Firm
Prior
Experience

CEOCMOPRFIRMEXP Dummy variable coded as 1 if the CEO and CMO have worked at
the same firm in the past, 0 otherwise

CEO General
Ability

CEOGENAB

CMO Gender

CMOGENDER

Principal component score of five measures a) Number of
positions held by the CEO in the past b) Number of firms in
which the CEO worked, c) Number of industries worked in by the
CEO, d) Previous CEO experience and e) Conglomerate
experience
Dummy variable indicating whether the CMO is female (1) or
male (0)

Data Sources
CMOs on the move
and news releases
Brand Asset
Valuator
COMPUSTAT,
CRSP,
Yahoo! Charts,
Fama French
& Liquidity Factors
Corporate
Affiliations
and executive
biographies
Corporate
Affiliations
and executive
biographies
Corporate
Affiliations
and executive
biographies
Corporate
Affiliations
and executive
biographies
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CMO MBA

CMOMBA

Dummy variable indicating whether the CMO has an MBA (1) or
not (0)

CMO Internal

CMOINTERN

Dummy variable indicating whether the CMO was hired from
inside the firm (1) or was an external hire (0)

CMO
Executive Vice
President Title
CEO Change

CMOEVPTITLE

CMO General
Ability

CMOGENAB

CEO Tenure

CEOTEN

Advertising
Intensity
Firm Earnings

ADINTEN

Dummy variable indicating whether the CMO has the title
“Executive Vice President”, 1= Executive Vice President,
0=Otherwise
Dummy variable indicating whether the firm had a new CEO, 1=
CEO change, 0=otherwise.
Principal component score of five measures a) Number of
positions held by the CMO in the past b) Number of firms in
which the CMO worked, c) Number of industries worked in by
the CMO, d) Previous CMO experience and e) Conglomerate
experience
Time in months from the CEO’s appointment until CEO exit or
end of 2013
Ratio of advertising expenditures of the firm to total sales.

FIRMEARNINGS

Firm’s earnings before taxes and interest

COMPUSTAT

SGA Intensity

SGAINTEN

Selling, General and Administrative expenses scaled by total sales

COMPUSTAT

Total Assets

ASSETS

Total Assets

COMPUSTAT

Analyst
Coverage
Industry

ANALYCOV

The average number of analysts following a firm for each year

I/B/E/S

I1, I2, I3

Dummy variable for industry sectors. I1 = Manufacturing (SICs

COMPUSTAT

CEOCHANGE

Corporate
Affiliations
and executive
biographies
Corporate
Affiliations
and executive
biographies
CMOs on the move
and news releases
Firm annual filings
Corporate
Affiliations
and executive
biographies
COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT

Dummy
Year Dummy

0100-04999), I2 = Retail (SICs 5000-5999), I3 = Services (SICs
6000-9999)
Y1-Y9

Dummy variable for years 2004-2012, Base year 2013
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Table 1.3 Frequency Distribution of Firms by Industry
SIC Code
15
20
22-23
25-28
30-31
34-39
44-45
47-48
50-51
52
53-54
56-59
60-63
70
72
73
75 & 79

Industry
Home Builders
Consumer Food Mfg.
Apparel Mfg.
Mattresses, Sanitary Products, Newspaper,
Publishing & Cosmetics
Tires and Leather Mfg.
Shaving, Computers, Telecommunications &
Photography
Cruise Lines and Airlines
Cable and Satellite Communication
Durable Goods Wholesalers and Retailers
Home Improvement Retailers
General Merchandise and Food Stores
Apparel, Consumer Electronics & Restaurants
Banks and Financial Services
Hotels
Personal Services
Software
Car Rental and Resorts
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Frequency
1.38%
8.63%
2.98%
5.44%
1.17%
7.02%
1.49 %
8.94%
2.66%
1.49%
6.81%
27.47%
16.18%
0.96%
1.81%
3.09%
2.45%

Table 1.4 Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

S.D.

No. of Observations

34.58

21.96

986

CMO Presence

.80

.35

1,269

CMO Gender

.35

.48

991

CMO MBA

.46

.50

976

CMO Internal

.33

.47

980

CMO Exec VP Title

.21

.41

1,269

CMO General Ability

-.01

1.34

936

CEO General Ability

.09

1.27

1,248

CEO Prior Marketing Experience

.17

.38

1,255

Same-Firm Prior Experience

.09

.29

1,269

CEO Change

.16

.36

1,269

66.26

73.88

1,514

.05

.05

1,268

Firm Earnings*

2976

6328

1,040

Brand Equity

71.15

23.64

1,219

SGA Intensity

.27

.15

1,757

Total Assets*

16,078.05

107,943.5

1,151

10.37

6.07

2,152

.04

.07

1,213

Panel A: CMO characteristics
CMO Tenure **

Panel B: CEO characteristics

CEO Tenure **
Panel C: Firm characteristics
Advertising Intensity

Average Analyst Coverage
Firm Cost of Capital
*in millions USD, ** in months
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Table 1.5 Weibull Regression Results of The Determinants of CMO Tenure

Variable
CMO Gender

CMO Tenure
-.16 **
[.07]
CMO MBA
-.19 ***
[.07]
CMO Internal
.05
[.08]
CMO EVP Title
.21 ***
[.08]
CEO Change
-.17 *
[.09]
CEO Marketing Experience
-.10
[.09]
Firm Earnings
1.5x 10-5 **
[6.76x10-6]
Advertising Intensity
.58
[.59]
Industry Dummy 1
-.15
[.10]
Industry Dummy 2
-.30 ***
[.10]
Year Dummies
Included
ln p
.79
[.05]
p (duration dependence)
2.20
[.12]
Log Likelihood
-391.62
Number of observations
835
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

49

Table 1.6 GLS Results of CMO Tenure on Cost of Capital and Brand Equity

Variable
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̂
CMOTENURE
CEO Prior
Marketing
Experience
Prior Same-Firm
Experience
CEO General Ability
̂
CMOTENURE
*
CEO Prior
Marketing
Experience
̂
CMOTENURE
*
Prior Same-Firm
Experience
̂
CMOTENURE
*CEO
General Ability
Controls
CMO General
Ability
CEO Tenure

Column I
Effect of CMO
Tenure on
Brand Equity
.065***
[.016]
-1.58
[1.42]

Column II
Effect of CMO
Tenure on CoC

-.00025***
[.00004]

Column III
Effect of CMO
Tenure on Cost
of Equity
-.00003**
[.000]

Column IV
Effect of CMO
Tenure on Cost
of Debt

Column V
Effect of
CMO Tenure
on Beta

.0005
[.002]

-.0022***
[.0008]

Column VI
Direct Effect of
CMO Tenure on
Brand Equity
.094***
[.014]
-.055
[.56]
3.66***
[.71]
1.12***
[.014]

-1.45
[1.90]
1.81***
[.48]
.03*
[.02]

.05**
[.02]
-.01**
[.005]
-.15
[.15]

-.094
[.15]
-4.0 x 10-5***
[8.46x10-6]

-5.44x10-6***
[2.03x10-6]

.0002
[.0003]

.0002
[.0001]

SGA Intensity
Total Assets
Analyst Coverage
Industry Fixed
Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Intercept

Included
Included
56.81***
[2.10]
758

-.048 ***
[.0059]
5.85x10-8 ***
[2.28x10-8]
-.0011***
[.0001]
Included

.0012
[.001]
1.95x10-9
[8.1x10-9]
-.00009***
[.000]
Included

Included
Included
.09***
.03***
[.007]
[.0016]
N
669
609
748.69 (16)
1033516 (16)
𝜒 2 (d.f.)
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, Robust standard errors in parentheses

.132
[.183]
-7.71x10-8
[6.39x10-7]
.0046
[.0057]
Included

.191**
[.095]
5.08x10-7*
[2.91x10-7]
.006
[.0018]
Included

Included

Included
-.0039
[1.56]
669
4.01 (16)

Included
1.27***
[.129]
669
165.14 (16)

Included
.094***
[.014]
758
1282.54 (16)
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Table 1.7 GLS Results of The Impact of Brand Equity on Cost of Capital

̂
BEQUITY

Column I
Indirect Effect
of CMO
Tenure on Cost
of Capital
-.001***
[.00]

Column II
Indirect Effect
of CMO
Tenure on Cost
of Equity
-.0005***
[.00]

Column III
Column IV
Indirect Effect Indirect Effect
of CMO
of CMO
Tenure on Cost Tenure on Beta
of Debt
.004
-.03***
[.029]
[.007]

̂
CMOTENURE

-7.67x10-5
[.00]

6.76x10-6
[.00]

.0005
[.0029]

.0009
[.001]

-.00007***
[9.46x10-6]
-.07 ***
[.006]
6.96x10-8***
[2.58x10-8]
-.0016***
[.00]
Included

-5.58x10-6**
[2.82x10-6]
.0017
[.001]
-7.6x10-10
[8.54x10-9]
-.00006**
[.00]
Included

.0001
[.0004]
.10
[.176]
1.20x10-9
[8.85x10-7]
-.0002
[.008]
Included

.0002
[.0002]
.136
[.088]
6.15x10-7***
[2.25x10-7]
-.0039**
[.0018]
Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Variable

Controls
CEO Tenure
SGA Intensity
Total Assets
Analyst
Coverage
Industry
Specific Effects
Year Specific
Effects
Intercept

.17***
.058***
-.12
[.018]
[.007]
[2.5]
N
609
609
609
2
3595.57
(17)
1033516
(17)
1.66 (17)
𝜒 (d.f.)
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, Robust standard errors in parentheses
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3.08***
[.389]
609
329.88 (17)

Table 1.8 Robustness Checks: Tests for Alternate Explanations
Column I
Effect of CMO
Tenure on TQ

Variable

-.001
[.0008]

̂
CMOTENURE
2
̂
CMOTENURE

Prior Same-Firm Experience
CEO Prior Marketing Experience
CEO General Ability
̂
CMOTENURE
* Prior Same-Firm
Experience
̂
CMOTENURE
* CEO Prior Marketing
Experience
̂
CMOTENURE
* CEO General Ability

Column II
Non-linear Effects
of CMO Tenure on
Brand Equity
.07***
[.02]
-.8.77x 10-5
[6.6 x 10-5]
-1.11
[1.45]
-2.3**
[1.2]
1.3***
[.4]
.02
[.02]
.05***
[.02]
-.01**
[.00]

Controls
CMO General Ability
CEO Tenure

.0003*
[.0002]
Industry Fixed Effects
Included
Year Fixed Effects
Included
SGA Intensity
-.059 ***
[.0068]
Total Assets
3.18x10-8
[1.94x10-8]
ROA
1.05***
[.14]
Leverage
-6.9x10-7 *
[3.59x10-7]
Intercept
1.34 ***
[.115]
N
792
536.8 (15)
𝜒 2 (d.f.)
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Included
Included

54.3***
[2.25]
861
108.6 (20)

Table 1.9 Post Hoc Analyses: Assessing the Managerial Relevance of CMO Tenure and Cost of Capital
Effect of 12-month increase in CMO
Tenure under conditions of
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Predicted
Brand Equity

Predicted Cost
of Capital

Financing Costs
(Unit: millions)

No CEO MKT Experience

70.54

4.1%

$1271

CEO MKT Experience

71.30

3.8%

$1178

No Same-Firm Prior Experience

70.67

4%

$1240

Same-Firm Prior Experience

73.92

3.5%

$1085

Low CEO General Ability

76.45

3.1%

$961

Average CEO General Ability

69.92

4.1%

$1271

High CEO General Ability

65.38

5%

$1550

Released Working
Capital
(Unit: Millions)
$1271-$1178= $93

$1240-$1085= $155

$1550-$961= $589
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